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INSIDE EDITION: OUT OF A PRIOR RESTRAINT
AND ABOVE THE LAW?
I. INTRODUCTION
The public's insatiable appetite for scandal and intrigue has always
supported a healthy market for investigative reporting, the most recent
entrants including a spate of tabloid television programs of the same genre
as the printed exposes commonly found at supermarket check-outs. While
the First Amendment affords producers of such information the same
protection as other, more reserved, members of the media, recent electronic
developments, particularly in videocamera technology, have enabled the
media to invade people's private lives to an extent which the framers of the
Constitution could not have conceived. These developments are placing
tremendous pressure on the juxtaposition of free speech and the still
amorphous right to privacy, leaving one to wonder not if a cataclysmic
adjustment between these rights will occur, but when the inevitable
realignment will take place.
Upon deciding In re King World Productions, Inc.,' ("King World")
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated a
temporary restraining order enjoining the news program Inside Edition from
broadcasting a secretly made videotape of a doctor purportedly engaging in
medical malpractice.2 The plaintiff doctor claimed the videotape was made
in violation of the federal anti-wiretap statute In vacating the order, the
court held that the doctor had failed to show the type of irreparable harm
necessary to overcome the strong presumption against prior restraints of
First Amendment rights.4
According to the doctrine of prior restraint, "the government may not
restrain a particular expression prior to its dissemination even though the
same expression could be constitutionally subjected to punishment after
dissemination." 5 Unlike most familiar prior restraint cases, the information
1. In re King World Prods., Inc., 898 F.2d 56 (6th Cir. 1990).
2. Id at 60.
3. Id. at 58; 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1988) (prohibits the interception and disclosure of wire, oral,
or electronic communications).
4. King World Prods., 898 F.2d at 60.
5. Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment
Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53 (1984).
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at issue in this case was allegedly obtained illegally. 6  The case further
defines the strict limits on prior restraints relating to the First Amendment
Freedom of the Press clause and brings into focus the courts' disparate
treatment of privacy and speech interests.7 This case also raises doubts as
to whether any limitations exist on the media's ability to gather and air
information in defiance of the law.8
This Note briefly traces the development of First Amendment prior
restraint law from colonial times to the present day, including the limits on
prior restraints.' It then reviews the facts and holding of King World.0
The reasoning of the court of appeals, the competing interest in privacy,
and the inadequacy of remedies under the current laws are discussed."
This case is then distinguished from other important prior restraint cases. 2
Finally, this Note examines how this case may help shape the future of
First Amendment law and constitutional values.' 3
H. HIsToRICAL BACKGROUND OF PRIOR RESTRAINT LAW
A. Early Conceptions of Freedom of the Press
Freedom of the press concepts and the aversion to prior restraints are
frequently traced to seventeenth century England. 4 The Licensing Act of
1662 required the acquisition of a license to import or sell books, the
licensing of all printed materials and the registration of printing presses by
a governmental monopoly called the Stationers' Company." The Act
expired some thirty years later in 1694, and the system was discontinued.
16
Eventually, freedom of the press came to be viewed as a right in Eng-
land."7 This chain of events inspired Blackstone's now famous observa-
6. In re King World Prods., Inc., 898 F.2d 56, 57-58 (6th Cir. 1990). See discussion infra
parts J.B, IV.D.
7. See discussion infra parts M, IV.A-B.
8. Id
9. See discussion infra part 1.
10. In re King World Prods., Inc., 898 F.2d 56 (6th Cir. 1990); see discussion infra part IM.
11. See discussion infra part IV.A-C.
12. See discussion infra part IV.D.
13. See discussion infra part V.
14. John C. Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE LJ. 409, 412 (1983); ROBERT
B. DOWNS, Freedom of Speech and Press: Development of a Concept, in THE FIRST FREEDOM
TODAY 2, 3 (Robert B. Downs & Ralph E. McCoy eds., 1984).
15. Jeffries, supra note 14, at 412; DOWNS, supra note 14, at 3.
16. Jeffries, supra note 14, at 412; DOWNS, supra note 14, at 3.
17. Jeffries, supra note 14, at 412.
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tion:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free
state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon
publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter
when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay
what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this is to
destroy the freedom of the press, but if he publishes what is
improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequence
of his own temerity."8
When America was colonized, contrary to popular notion, freedom of
expression was not an ideal that gained immediate currency in the New
World.19 The colonial legislative assemblies, for example, were extremely
intolerant of seditious libel.20 Early Americans found religious liberty not
through the law, but by settling geographically with others of similar
beliefs.21 It was therefore in a setting of repression that the framers began
drafting the Constitution.'
When drafting the original Constitution, the framers believed a bill of
rights was unnecessary because the federal government was to be limited
to certain delegated powers? "For why declare [in a bill of rights] that
things shall not be done which there is no power to do? Why, for instance
should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when
no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed?"2  The absence
of such a bill of rights, however, proved a significant barrier to the
Constitution's ratification.2? In response, the first ten amendments to the
Constitution, the Bill of Rights, were proposed during the first session of
Congress in 1789 and were ratified effective December 15, 1791.26
Thus, the drafters provided that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom . . of the press."'  Unfortunately, they left no
guide as to what they believed this should mean.' Interestingly, however,
18. IM at 413 (quoting 4 WLLAM BLACKSTONE COMMENrARmS 152).
19. DOWNS, supra note 14, at 2-3.
20. Id. at 3-4.
21. Id. at 2-3.
22. Id. at 5.
23. 1d.; MLvnI.E B. NIMMER, NmmER ON FREEDOM OF SPEEcH 1-2 (1984).
24. NIMMER, supra note 23, at 1-2 n.4 (quoting The FEDERAIST No. 84 (ALEXANDER
HAMLTON)).
25. 1a at 1-2, 1-3.
26. Id. at 1-3.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
28. NIMMER, supra note 23, at 1-2 to 1-4.
19921
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much of the debate surrounding the First Amendment is relatively recent
history.29 What follows is a discussion of the twentieth century case law
in this area.
B. The Free Press and Prior Restraint Doctrine Today
1. Near v. Minnesota
The modem doctrine of prior restraint finds its main precedent in Near
v. Minnesota." In Near, the Supreme Court examined a Minnesota law
which provided that the publication of "a malicious, scandalous, and
defamatory newspaper" could be enjoined as a nuisance.31 The defendant
published 'The Saturday Press" which ran a series of articles critical of
various government officials.32 The trial court found that the paper
violated the statute and permanently enjoined further publication.33 Upon
review, the Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional, declaring that
it, in effect, amounted to censorship.' Reflecting upon the First Amend-
ment Freedom of the Press clause, the Court stated that "[iln determining
the extent of the constitutional protection it has been generally, if not
universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the guaranty to
prevent previous restraints upon publication."35
The Court did, however, recognize limited exceptions to the general
prohibition.36 Where national security is at stake, the Court stated, "[n]o
one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction
to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports
or the number and location of troops."3  Restriction of obscenity,
incitement to violence, the forceful overthrow of government and "words
that may have all the effect of force 38 were also deemed worthy excep-
tions.
39
29. 1& at 1-3.
30. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Jeffries, supra note 14, at 414.
31. Near, 283 U.S. at 702.
32. Id. at 703-04.
33. Id. at 706.
34. Id. at 713, 722-23.
35. Id at 713.
36. Near, 283 U.S. at 716.
37. Id.
38. Schenck v. United States, 249 US. 47, 52 (1919).
39. Near, 283 U.S. at 716.
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2. Kingsley Books v. Brown
In 1957 the Supreme Court had occasion to refine the theory of prior
restraint of obscenity in Kingsley Books v. Brown.4° In that case, a section
of the New York criminal code authorized the issuance of an injunction
prior to trial of the sale and distribution of obscenity provided the court
observed certain procedural safeguards designed to protect the rights of the
accused to a prompt determination of the matter' The Supreme Court
upheld the law, finding it no more restrictive of speech than many schemes
of subsequent punishment.42
3. New York limes Company v. United States
The national security exception discussed in Near4 was the subject
of the famous 1971 Pentagon Papers Case, New York limes Co. v. United
States.' Two newspapers, the New York Times and the Washington Post,
planned to publish a secret study entitled "History of U.S. Decision-Making
Process on Viet Nam Policy."45 When the United States attempted to
enjoin the papers, the cases were rapidly appealed all the way to the
Supreme Court." The cases evoked a strong reaction from the Court; a
short per curiam opinion was accompanied by six concurring opinions and
three dissents.47 The per curiam opinion said only that the government
had not met the heavy burden of justifying the prior restraint in the face of
a strong presumption against its validity.'
Justice Black, however, would have vacated the injunction without
even an oral argument4 He believed the government had no power ever
to enjoin the publication of news.50 He remarked, "In my view it is
unfortunate that some of my Brethren are apparently willing to hold that the
40. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
41. Id. at 437.
42. Id. at 442-44.
43. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
44. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
45. Id at 714.
46. Id. at 714, 753.
47. See generally iS Concurring opinions were filed by Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan,
Stewart, White and Marshall. Dissenting opinions were filed by Mr. Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Harlan and Blackmun.
48. Id. at 714.
49. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
50. Id. at 715.
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publication of news may sometimes be enjoined. Such a holding would
make a shambles of the First Amendment."' Justice Douglas shared
Justice Black's view and believed that Congress shared it as well since they
had made no effort to prevent publication of the information at issue.52
But the other concurring opinions were less extreme. Justice Brennan, for
example, concurred in the holding but seemed to favor limiting its reach to
factually similar situations; he acknowledged that in some instances national
security interests could justify a prior restraint.5  Justice Stewart only
reluctantly joined after finding that the relief requested was in fact an
executive, rather than judicial, function.'
4. Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart
The rights of the accused to a fair trial were balanced against the
freedom of the press in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart.5 The Nebraska
Supreme Court modified a lower court's gag order so that the media was
prevented from reporting information on the confessions or admissions of
a multiple murder suspect and on "facts 'strongly implicative' of the
accused."56 Upon review, the Supreme Court cited a "whole panoply of
protections" for the criminal defendant through the process of appellate
review and said "[a] prior restraint, by contrast and by definition, has an
immediate and irreversible sanction."'  In reversing the Nebraska court,
the Supreme Court said that the alternatives to prior restraint (change of
venue, careful questioning of potential jurors, etc.) had neither been shown
inadequate nor had the effectiveness of the prior restraint in protecting the
rights of the accused been demonstrated."
5. Seattle Times Company v. Rhinehart
Finally, in the more recent case of Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,5 9
the Supreme Court considered whether information gained through pre-trial
51. Id
52. Id. at 720-22.
53. Id. at 724-27.
54. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 727-30 (1971).
55. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
56. Id. at 545.
57. Id. at 559.
58. Id. at 565-67.
59. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
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discovery in preparation of a civil suit was protected by the First Amend-
ment.' Members of a religious organization sued two newspapers for
defamation after the papers ran a series of articles about the group."1
Citing a fear of harassment and other adverse affects, the organization
sought and obtained an order from the trial court restricting the newspapers'
use of certain information obtained through discovery. 62 In upholding the
order, the Supreme Court stated "[a] litigant has no First Amendment right
of access to information made available only for purposes of trying his
suit."' It was the method by which the information was obtained,
however, and not the information itself, that formed the basis for the court's
decision: "[Ihe party may disseminate the identical information covered
by the protective order as long as the information is gained through means
independent of the court's processes."'6
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Facts of In re King World Productions, Inc.
Dr. Stuart M. Berger, the respondent in this case, lived and practiced
medicine in New York.' He was nationally known for his diet pro-
gram,6 wrote a weekly column for the New York Post6 and authored
the best-sellers Dr. Berger's Immune Power Diet, The Southhampton Diet,
and How to Be Your Own Nutritionist.f' Dr. Berger appeared on a variety
of television and radio programs and was the subject of several news
articles.69
The doctor's methods and claims regarding his diet program and
medical practice were controversial and attracted extensive criticism. 0 At
60. Id at 22.
61. Id. at 22-23.
62. 1d at 26-27.
63. Id at 32.
64. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 US. 20, 34 (1984).
65. In re King World Prods., Inc., 898 F.2d 56, 57 (6th Cir. 1990).
66. Id.
67. Federal Court Enjoins Exclusive 'Inside Edition' Footage Revealing Practices of New
York Nutritionist Dr. Stuart Berger, PR Newswire, Jan. 19, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, CURRNT File [hereinafter Federal Court Enjoins].
68. Diet Doctor Loses Bid to Halt TV Program, UPI, Jan. 30, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, CURRNT File (hereinafter Diet Doctor Loses Bid].
69. In re King World Prods., Inc., 898 F.2d at 57.
70. Id
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the time the appellate court was writing its opinion for this case, Dr. Berger
was under investigation by the New York State Department of Health,
Office of Professional Medical Conduct for allegedly unethical and
fraudulent conduct.! The investigation was reported by ABC News, the
Wall Street Journal and other news organizations.7
The petitioner in this case, King World Productions, was a New York
corporation that produced and broadcasted the news program Inside Edition
through its subsidiary, Inside Edition, Inc.' In January 1990, Inside
Edition was rated eighth highest in first-run syndicated programs.74 Other
top-rated shows distributed by King World included 'Wheel of Fortune,"
"Jeopardy," and "The Oprah Winfrey Show."'  The company also
distributed feature films and television programs, sold advertising, and
owned a television station in Buffalo, New York. 6
In October 1989, during an investigation of Dr. Berger, Inside Edition
sent producer Amy Wasserstrom to his office posing as a patient."
Equipped with a hidden videocamera, Wasserstrom secretly taped the visit
during which the doctor allegedly committed medical malpractice and
engaged in unethical behavior.7 'During that first visit," Wasserstrom
reported, "before receiving the results of any tests, Dr. Berger diagnosed me
as having 'chronic fatigue syndrome' and prescribed a course of treatment
which included fatigue shots."79 She was billed $845 for the visit.8" On
her second visit, Dr. Berger diagnosed her as being allergic to yeast and
billed her $221.8' During her third visit, she was given an intravenous
"drip" treatment of vitamins.' At some point during the course of the
investigation, two certified physicians pronounced Wasserstrom healthy.'
One particular examination failed to disclose a yeast allergy." Inside
Edition then revealed to Dr. Berger their plan to show the videotape during
71. Id
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Federal Court Enjoins, supra note 67.
75. Id
76. Id
77. Diet Doctor Loses Bid supra note 68; In re King World Prods., Inc., 898 F.2d 56,57 (6th
Cir. 1990).
78. Diet Doctor Loses Bi4 supra note 68; King World Prod., 898 F.2d at 56-58.
79. Diet Doctor Loses Bid, supra note 68.
80. id
81.Id
82. Id.
83. Federal Court Enjoins, supra note 67.
84. Diet Doctor Loses BiM4 supra note 68.
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a report on his medical practice.'
Dr. Berger sued King World in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan to enjoin the broadcast of the videotape.
s6
He contended that surreptitiously videotaping the office visits constituted
a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (the federal anti-wiretap statute), invasion
of privacy, fraud, and trespass.87 The doctor claimed he would suffer
irreparable harm from the broadcast" and sought $10 million in damages
in addition to the injunction.89
Based on the violation of federal anti-wiretap law and New York tort
law, the district court issued a temporary restraining order on January 18,
1990, prohibiting Inside Edition from broadcasting the videotapes on its
January 22, 1990, program?0 The district court's decision hinged on the
construction of the federal anti-wiretap law found in Stockler v. Garratt.9'
There, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that liability under the
statute applies even if the illegal recording is not actually used for criminal
or tortious purposes.' Rejecting King World's freedom of the press
defense, the district court stated, "the First Amendment is just not interested
in protecting the news media from calculated misdeeds."9 King World
immediately petitioned the United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit,
for a writ of mandamus claiming the temporary restraining order was an
unconstitutional prior restraint of its First Amendment rights.
94
B. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' Decision
In considering King World's petition, the court of appeals noted that
the writ of mandamus traditionally has been used "to confine a lower court
to lawfully exercise its prescribed jurisdiction or compel it to exercise its
authority when it is its duty to so act."95 Mandamus is a drastic remedy
85. In re King World Prods., Inc., 898 F.2d 56, 58 (6th Cir. 1990).
86. Id.
87. Id
88. Id
89. Inside Edition Wins Case Over Diet Doctor, UPL Jan. 29, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, CURRNT File.
90. In re King World Prods., Inc., 898 F.2d 56, 58 (6th Cir. 1990).
91. Id at 59 (citing Stockier v. Garratt, 893 F.2d 856 (6th Cir. 1990)).
92. Id at 59.
93. Id
94. Id at 57-58.
95. In re King World Prods., Inc., 898 F.2d 56, 58 (6th Cir. 1990).
1992]
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used only in extraordinary circumstances.9 The court pointed out that
"[there must be a demonstration of a clear abuse of discretion or conduct
amounting to usurpation of judicial power in order to grant such a writ."
A key issue to the court of appeals' decision was whether the district
court's order was clearly erroneous as a matter of law.98 That consider-
ation in turn depended on whether the temporary restraining order violated
King World's First Amendment rights."
The appellate court rejected the district court's finding that a violation
of the anti-wiretap statute could form the basis for limiting the media's
First Amendment rights." The court of appeals said that "[w]hile
section 2511 proscribes certain conduct, it in no way provides for a prior
restraint of the press in their exercise of [F]irst [A]mendment rights even
if the press's conduct clearly violates section 2511."' ° Further, the court
said that the purpose of the First Amendment is to protect the right to
disseminate information such as that in the videotape regardless of how it
is obtained.' °2
In support of its position, the court of appeals pointed out that even
publication of national security information had been protected from prior
restraint." "Any prior restraint," the court said, "bears a heavy presump-
tion against its constitutional validity."'" The fact that the district court's
order was temporary did not lighten the presumption because "a prior
restraint, by ... definition, has an immediate and irreversible sanction."1"5
The court acknowledged that Inside Edition's broadcast of the
videotape might embarrass Dr. Berger and cautioned that their decision was
not to be construed as approval of the program's methods.' 6 The court
held, however, that Dr. Berger failed to show an irreparable injury
sufficient to justify a prior restraint of Inside Edition's First Amendment
rights."°7 The district court was therefore found to have abused its
discretion and the writ of mandamus was granted, compelling the district
96. BLACK'S LAW DicTIoNARY 961 (6th ed. 1990).
97. In re King World Prods., Inc., 898 F.2d 56, 58 (6th Cir. 1990).
98. Id. at 59.
99. See id.
100. IM
101. IM
102. In re King World Prods., Inc., 898 F.2d 56, 59 (6th Cir. 1990).
103. Id at 59-60 (citing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)).
104. Id at 60 (citations omitted).
105. King World, 898 F.2d at 60 (citing Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559
(1976)).
106. In re King World Prods., Inc., 898 F.2d 56, 60 (6th Cir. 1990).
107. Id
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court to vacate its temporary restraining order.10'
Following the court of appeals' decision, Dr. Berger petitioned the
United States Supreme Court for a stay, pending review of the case by the
Court. 9 Justice Scalia denied the request without comment. 10
IV. ANALYSiS AND CRrTQUE
A. The Court of Appeals' Reasoning in King World
Legal scholars have variously characterized the doctrine of prior
restraint as confused, simplistic, and irrelevant.'' Perhaps for the same
reasons, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals could offer only superficial
justification for its decision in King World. In response to the district
court's temporary restraining order enjoining the broadcast of the surrepti-
tiously made videotape, the court of appeals propounded a belief in the
media's virtually absolute freedom from prior restraints under the First
Amendment."' Inexplicably, the court of appeals then adopted a more
moderate balancing test to determine if the restraining order was warrant-
ed." 3 Concluding without explanation that it was not warranted, the
court vacated the order
14
1. An Unqualified Freedom of the Press Asserted
Recalling that a prior restraint had been invalidated even where
national security information was involved, the court cited New York limes
v. United States,"5 the Pentagon Papers case, for the proposition that:
Protection of the right to information that appeals to the public at
large and which is disseminated by the media is the cornerstone
of the free press clause of the [F]irst [A]mendment. No matter
how inappropriate the acquisition, or its correctness, the right to
disseminate that information is what the Constitution intended to
108. Id
109. Diet Doctor Loses Bid, supra note 68.
110. Id
111. Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648,
649 (1955); Redish, supra note 5, at 59; Jeffries, supra note 14, at 420.
112. In re King World Prods., Inc., 898 F.2d 56, 59-60 (6th Cir. 1990).
113. Id at 60.
114. Id
115. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
1992]
174 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL (Vol.13
protect
116
But how the New York 7imes decision can be made to stand for this
expansive view of prior restraint law was not explained by the King World
court.
To be sure, the concurring opinions of Justice Black and Justice
Douglas in New York Times, with their distinct absolutist slant,"' would
lend support for an argument that the King World court's view should be
the law. But, as previously discussed, the holding of the Supreme Court
in the brief per curiam opinion in New York 7imes speaks only of a heavy
presumption against prior restraints and is devoid of any language
approaching the extreme view adopted by the court of appeals in King
World.118
2. A Balancing Standard Adopted
After espousing an unqualified freedom of the press, the court of
appeals, in a peculiar turn of reasoning, retreated and stated that there was
merely a strong presumption against prior restraints; a view that accurately
reflects the holding of the Supreme Court in New York Times. 9 The
court then pronounced this rule: "In order to support the temporary
restraining order, Dr. Berger must show that he will suffer an irreparable
harm great enough to justify a prior restraint in the face of this stringent
standard."'" A non sequitur at best, the weighing of interests implicit in
this rule seems to directly contradict the absolute privilege of the press
previously asserted.
Furthermore, the court offered no authority in support of its balancing
standard."' This is not to suggest that a balancing standard is inappropri-
ate, as will be discussed later." But the court of appeals did not claim
to establish a new rule; rather the balancing standard seems to be offered
as the logical conclusion to the propositions cited from earlier cases."
Unfortunately, the infirmity of the court's balancing standard does not end
there.
116. King World, 898 F.2d at 59.
117. See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714-724; supra part ILB.3.
118. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714.
119. In re King World Prods., Inc., 898 F.2d 56, 60 (6th Cir. 1990).
120. Id
121. Id
122. See discussion infra part V.B.
123. In re King World Prods., Inc., 898 F.2d 56, 60 (6th Cir. 1990).
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broadcast.125 The court then held, "Dr. Berger has simply failed to show
the type of irreparable harm or injury that would tip the scale toward
justifying a prior restraint.""
The court of appeals granted Inside Edition's petition for a writ of
mandamus, thereby requiring the district court to vacate its temporary
restraining order."7 The summary manner with which the court dealt
with the issue suggests, perhaps, that in reality the standard actually applied
was closer to the absolutist, but contradictory, position first expressed by
the court. "We do not," the court concluded, "nibble away at [FMirst
[A]mendment rights."'2' What other rights have been devoured in the
wake of this decision, however, may be open to question.
B. Privacy Interests Ignored by the Court of Appeals
Justice Douglas said "[tihe right to be let alone is indeed the beginning
of all freedom.""' Apparently, however, the court of appeals in King
World believed that the recognition of an enforceable130 right to be let
alone would mark the end of the freedom of the press. While purporting
to weigh Dr. Berger's justification for imposing a prior restraint on Inside
Edition, the court neglected even to discuss the infringement on Dr.
Berger's privacy represented by the surreptitious videotape.' The court
apparently failed to consider that the enactment of the federal anti-wiretap
statute suggests the existence of a congressionally recognized privacy
interest in situations such as the one confronted by Dr. Berger."
Furthermore, the court of appeals ignored some important guidelines
provided by the Supreme Court in a case also involving a conflict between
the media's First Amendment rights and an individual's privacy rights.
133
125. 1d
126. 1&
127. 1L
128. In re King World Prods., Inc., 898 F.2d 56, 60 (6th Cir. 1990).
129. Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
130. Because damages are inadequate as a remedy (see discussion infra part IV.C.), vacating
the temporary restraining order in this case had the effect of denying the protection of the right
to privacy.
131. See King World, 898 F.2d at 60.
132. See infra part V.B.1.
133. See infra part V.B.2.
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While serviceable as a general principle, the standard articulated by the
court is hopelessly vague as a working rule against which a set of facts may
be evaluated. "Dr. Berger must show," the court said, "that he will suffer
an irreparable harm great enough to justify a prior restraint."" What
level of proof is required by the word "show?" A preponderance of the
evidence? Clear and convincing evidence? Evidence leaving no reasonable
doubt?
What is the definition of "irreparable harm?" Does it include injuries
that cannot be reduced to a monetary value, such as the loss of reputation
and self-esteem? Does it include economic losses that are nearly impossi-
ble to quantify with any degree of certainty, such as the loss of future
business?
How great is "great enough?" If Dr. Berger had shown that the
broadcast of the videotape would cause the loss of 50% of his medical
practice regardless of the truth of the allegations, would that have been
great enough? Would 75% be enough? Or 90%?
If a court is permitted to consider harm that cannot be quantified, such
as the loss of reputation and self-esteem, by what standard should the court
gauge such a loss? According to Dr. Berger's perception-a subjective
standard? Or by a "reasonable person's" perception-an objective
standard?
Finally, how are the media's interests to be balanced against the
plaintiffs? Should different kinds of information which the media may seek
to publish or broadcast receive different weights in the eyes of the court?
For example, should extremely personal information about a private
individual be entitled to as much protection from prior restraint as
information about alleged governmental misconduct?
3. An Unsupported Conclusion
The King World court did not answer these questions. In fact, the
court did not offer any guidance, either by reference to authority in the case
law or by a detailed analysis leading to its own decision, on how its
balancing standard should be applied. The court simply rejected without
explanation Dr. Berger's contention that proving damages would be
extremely difficult if Inside Edition were permitted to broadcast the
videotape and acknowledged he may suffer some embarrassment from the
124. 1M
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1. The Existence of a Congressionally Recognized Privacy Interest
The existence of a congressionally recognized privacy interest in the
King World case is evidenced by the code allegedly violated by Inside
Edition: 18 U.S.C. § 2511, the federal anti-wiretap statute. That law
proscribes interception and disclosure of wire, oral or electronic communi-
cations." 4 While abuse by law enforcement agencies was probably the
main concern of Congress in enacting this legislation, it is clear that privacy
was the underlying value which they sought to protect.135 "Privacy," a
Senate Report said, "cannot be left to depend solely on physical protection,
or it will gradually erode as technology advances. Congress must act to
protect the privacy of our citizens. If we do not, we will promote the
gradual erosion of this precious right."'
36
The prophetic comment in the Senate Report was fulfilled with
startling accuracy in the King World case. As video cameras have become
smaller and more sophisticated, their use has grown'37 and the opportuni-
ties for the invasion of privacy have burgeoned. These technological
advances enabled Inside Edition to smuggle a camera into Dr. Berger's
office and secretly videotape him-a feat that would have been impossible
only a few years ago.' Thus, resort to physical protection in a home or
office no longer provides the measure of privacy that it did before these
advances.
The elevation of privacy to the status of a right is a relatively recent
development in our society. 39 Arguably, this is because the need for
protection of privacy is relatively recent as well."4 The inherently
personal nature of privacy concerns, however, has thwarted a precise
definition of the right; instead, society has carved out certain aspects of life
and denominated them "private."' 4 For example, freedom of association,
sanctity of the home, and control over a person's own body have been
134. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1988).
135. S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
136. Id.
137. See Jane Hall, Should Hidden Cameras Be Used For TV News?, LA. TIMES, Jan. 25,
1990, § F (Calendar), at 1.
138. Id.
139. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 488 (1975) ("Tllhe century has
experienced a strong tide running in favor of the so-called right of privacy."); Arthur R. Miller,
The William 0. Douglas Lecture: Press Versus Privacy, 16 GoNz. L. REv. 843, 845 (1981);
Irwin R. Kramer, The Full Court Press: Sacrificing Vital Privacy Interests on the Altar of First
Amendment Rhetoric, 8 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 113, 119 (1989).
140. Miller, supra note 139, at 845.
141. Id.; Kramer, supra note 139, at 119.
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recognized by the Supreme Court as constitutionally protected.' 42
Congress recognized the threat to privacy posed by the explosive
growth in technology and accordingly enacted the federal anti-wiretap
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2511.43 If, as Dr. Berger claimed, Inside Edition
violated section 2511 when it secretly videotaped him, he plainly suffered
an invasion of his privacy which Congress had actively and explicitly
sought to protect.
2. Privacy and Prior Restraint in Seattle Times Company v. Rhinehart
Even if Dr. Berger had a legally recognized privacy interest that was
violated by Inside Edition, it does not follow from that fact alone that he
was entitled to the temporary restraining order. However, the case law is
not entirely silent on this point. In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,'" the
Supreme Court recognized privacy as a legitimate consideration in
evaluating a prior restraint of the press.45 The Supreme Court in Seattle
Times upheld a prior restraint on the dissemination of information gained
through discovery, finding a substantial governmental interest" in
preventing abuse of the pre-trial discovery process.147 The Court ob-
served that the rules of discovery provided litigants with the opportunity to
obtain information that, if released, could infringe on privacy interests."
The Court concluded that "[t]he prevention of the abuse that can attend the
coerced production of information under a State's discovery rule is
sufficient justification for the authorization of protective orders." 49
Therefore, in Seattle Times, the issue of whether or not the media had
the right to disseminate the information in question turned on the way in
which that information was obtained.15 The Supreme Court made much
142. Miller, supra note 139, at 844-45 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,462 (1958);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973)).
143. S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
144. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehar 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
145. See id. at 30, 34-36.
146. Id at 35. The complete test employed by the Court in determining whether the prior
restraint could be applied was to determine "whether the 'practice in question [furthers] an
important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression' and
whether 'the limitation of First Amendment freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary or essential
to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved."' Md. at 32 (quoting Procunier
v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974)).
147. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 37 (1984).
148. Id. at 34-36.
149. Id. at 35-36.
150. Id. at 34.
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of the fact that the media obtained the information in question only through
the rules of discovery, calling the process "a matter of legislative
grace."'s5  The Court said that the First Amendment did not extend to
information gathered in this way. 52
In King World, however, not only was the information at issue not
made available through "legislative grace," it was specifically protected by
the legislature through the federal anti-wiretap statute.1 53  Yet the court
of appeals effortlessly found that the First Amendment entitled the media
to disseminate the information.' 4 This disregard of legislative intent in
defining what information is protected by the First Amendment is
irreconcilable with the principles articulated by the Supreme Court in
Seattle imes.
55
The divergence between the court of appeals' view and the Supreme
Court's view in these two cases is apparent in their respective statements
regarding the right of the media to gather information. Finding that court
control over discovered information did not rise to the level of censorship,
the Supreme Court in Seattle Times quoted an earlier case saying, "[tlhe
right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to
gather information."'" In contrast, the court of appeals believed that
151. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984). By way of further emphasis,
the Court said "the party may disseminate the identical information covered by the protective
order as long as the information is gained through means independent of the court's processes."
Id. at 34.
152. "A litigant has no First Amendment right of access to information made available only
for purposes of trying his suit." I&a t 32.
153. In re King World Prods., Inc., 898 F.2d 56,58 (6th Cir. 1990); 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1988).
154. "Protection of the right to information that appeals to the public at large and which is
disseminated by the media is the cornerstone of the free press clause of the [Fjirst [A]mendment."
King World 898 F.2d at 59.
155. It may be tempting to draw a distinction between the cases based on the fact that in
Seattle Times, the Washington state rules of discovery (Rule 26 (c)) specifically provided for an
injunctive order whereas the federal anti-wiretap law made no such provision. Possibly Congress
believed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b), Temporary Restraining Orders, provided sufficient
authorization for a prior restraint. The rules of discovery make the information legally available
to the opposing party, therefore some sort of protection must be provided to prevent the unjust
damage to reputation and invasion of privacy cited by the Court in Seattle Tines. In the case of
the anti-wiretap statute, however, the government's primary motive was to prevent the information
from even becoming available. See S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). It was
therefore reasonable that Congress would expect the courts to adhere to traditional notions of
justice by denying a wilful violator of § 2511 of the fruits of her wrongdoing and, further, to avail
themselves of all the tools already at their disposal, including the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
156. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984) (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381
U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965)).
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"[n]o matter how inappropriate the acquisition, or its correctness, the right
to disseminate that information is what the Constitution intended to
protect.'
157
C. Comparison of Available Remedies
In seeking the restraining order, it was Dr. Berger's contention that
damages would be difficult to prove if Inside Edition were allowed to air
the videotape. 8 In response, the court of appeals said, "[w]e fail to see
how the broadcast of the video footage will hamper Dr. Berger's ability to
prove the alleged torts or the alleged violations of section 25l."'1 59 But
this conclusory remark misses the point. In effect, Dr. Berger was
complaining of the inadequacy of damages as a remedy because they would
be difficult (or impossible) to quantify. The court of appeals offered no
answer to this. 60
As one writer said regarding prior restraints and national security,
"virginity matters."16' The comment was in reference to the fact that for
some types of speech the amount of "harm" caused by the speech varies
with the frequency of publication.6 If, for example, a work of obscenity
causes harm when published, a similar harm will likely result from each
subsequent publication."e In the case of a national security secret,
however, all of the damage from publication results from the initial
disclosure!' 4 Once the secret is disclosed, no further harm results from
subsequent disclosure because the information is no longer secret. That
writer suggests a prior restraint may be more defensible in the second
situation when the damage flows almost exclusively from the initial
disclosure.'65 This is the situation in King World. Whatever damage Dr.
Berger sustained from the disclosure occurred primarily from the first
broadcast of the videotapes. His only opportunity to avoid the damage was
to prevent the initial showing of the tapes; after that, he was left with the
task of quantifying the damage already done.
Presumably, the damage to Dr. Berger's medical practice was
157. In re King World Prods., Inc., 898 F.2d 56, 59 (6th Cir. 1990).
158. Id at 60.
159. Id
160. Id
161. Jeffries, supra note 14, at 412.
162. Id
163. Id
164. Id
165. Id
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susceptible to quantification by comparing business activity before and after
the broadcast. Undoubtedly, however, evidentiary problems would make
it difficult to be precise in this area and convincing a jury could be even
more difficult. But this aside, there is the injury to Dr. Berger personally
from the invasion of his privacy. Professor Arthur Miller observed that
"[ioss of privacy leads to loss of dignity and loss of self."'" Being
forced to reduce that loss to a dollar value aggravates it. How does one put
a price tag on her own dignity? For this reason, a part of Dr. Berger's
injury was irreparable, making a prior restraint the most complete remedy.
D. Distinguishing King World from Other Major Prior Restraint Cases
Regardless of the cursory nature of the court of appeals' analysis in
King World, its dislike of prior restraints joins a long tradition in history
and in case law. 67 The court neglected to consider, however, several
important distinctions between the facts of King World and those of other
important prior restraint decisions. As a result, this case serves mainly to
confuse, rather than clarify, the law.
1. New York Times Company v. United States
As discussed, the court of appeals in King World relied heavily in its
decision on the New York Times case and attached considerable weight to
the fact that "even prior restraint of the dissemination of national security
information has been denied."'" But the court failed to recognize the
strong countervailing interests at stake in New York Times. The information
at issue in that case was a classified study concerning United States
involvement in the Vietnam War." The government sought to prevent
publication because of the potential damage to national security that
publication could cause. 70 Obviously, the government had a strong
interest in national security. However, the same information was also
valuable for informing the public of the government's activities in that
166. Miller, supra note 139, at 845.
167. See generally supra part IU.
168. In re King World Prods., Inc., 898 F.2d 56, 59-60 (6th Cir. 1990).
169. New York Tunes Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
170. Id. at 725 (Brennan, 1., concurring).
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highly controversial war.17 ' Supervising and reporting the actions of
government has always been the premier function of a free press.12
Therefore, in New York Times, the characteristic of the information that
created an interest in the government (national security) also created an
interest in the press (informing the public on a critical national issue).
Thus, it was not so much a matter of a prior restraint being too
offensive to the Constitution to stand even when national security was at
stake, as the court of appeals in King World suggested; rather, it was a
matter of strong competing interests to be weighed against each other. In
the King World case, no similar issue of public debate was involved, only
the actions of a private doctor. 73  Consequently, the strong policy
consideration of ensuring that the media is able to bring information before
the public was absent in King World.174
2. Near v. Minnesota
Like New York Times, Near v. Minnesota"5 involved a strong public
policy interest in not restraining the information sought to be published. 7 6
In Near, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state law which
permitted a trial court to enjoin the publication of a newspaper running
articles critical of local government."r Addressing the historical roots of
the free press, the Supreme Court in Near stated "[tihat liberty was
especially cherished for the immunity it afforded from previous restraint of
the publication of censure of public officers and charges of official
misconduct."'"8 Again, unlike King World, this case involved an impor-
tant issue of public debate.
171. "A debate of large proportions goes on in the Nation over our posture in Vietnam. That
debate antedated the disclosure of the contents of the present documents. The latter are highly
relevant to the debate in progress." Il& at 724 (Douglas, J., concurring).
172. "The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the
people." Id. at 717. See generally. DowNs, supra note 14; NIMMER, supra note 23.
173. In re King World Prods., Inc., 898 F.2d 56, 57-58 (6th Cir. 1990).
174. See infra part V.A regarding the public's interest in knowing about a doctor's
malpractice.
175. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
176. Id.
177. L. at 702-03, 722-23.
178. Id. at 717.
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3. Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart'" involved a murder trial gag
order.' The Supreme Court determined that the rights of the accused
were adequately protected through means other than a prior restraint of
speech (change of venue, appellate review, etc.).' 8' The rights of the
press, however, were severely compromised by the gag order. 2 In King
World, on the other hand, Dr. Berger had no preventative means of
protecting his rights other than the temporary restraining order. His only
remedy was to seek damages in a civil action after the violation of his
rights had already occurred.
Furthermore, in Nebraska Press, the Supreme Court characterized the
press' injury from the prior restraint as "immediate and irreversible."'"
If the immediacy and irreversiblilty of an injury are relevant considerations
where the press' rights are concerned, the same considerations should apply
to those rights that are in conflict with the press' rights. What the King
World court failed to consider was the duration of the violation. If Inside
Edition had the right to broadcast the videotape, the injury caused by the
temporary restraining order, while immediate and irreversible, would
nonetheless be temporary, pending the court's final order. When the order
was lifted, Inside Edition would be free to broadcast the tape. The
enjoyment of the right would not be destroyed but only suspended for a
limited period of time.
If, however, Inside Edition did not have the right to broadcast the
videotape, the injury to Dr. Berger was not only immediate and irreversible,
but permanent as well. Once the videotape was aired, the intrusion on Dr.
Berger's privacy was complete; the essential characteristic of privacy-secl-
usion-was destroyed. Dr. Berger may be compensated, but the violation
lingers on and the enjoyment of the right is gone forever.
179. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
180. Id at 541.
181. Id at 559, 563-65.
182. "A prior restraint, by contrast and by definition, has an immediate and irreversible
sanction. If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication 'chills'
speech, prior restraint 'freezes' it at least for the time." Id at 559.
183. Id
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE KING WORLD DECISION
AND THE FUTURE OF PRIOR RESTRAINT LAW
A. The Message to the Media: Double Standards
and Economic Incentives
Some people will probably have difficulty mustering any sympathy for
Dr. Berger; after all, the videotape showed the doctor engaging in allegedly
blatant medical malpractice.'" An argument could be made that Inside
Edition performed a valuable public service by exposing a charlatan. The
problem with such an argument is, of course, that excusing the media's
conduct based on the results achieved would make a shambles of our
system of justice. Is the media now to act as some sort of super-police
force? Has it gone from government watchdog to government surro-
gate?"s Who will be the media's watchdog? Whether guilty or inno-
cent, Dr. Berger suffered as a result of Inside Edition's broadcast. Are
accused wrongdoers to be tried in the media without the benefit of any of
the procedural safeguards built into a criminal or civil trial?
Nor can the bitter hypocrisy of the situation easily be ignored. Inside
Edition self-righteously garbed itself in the First Amendment and mounted
an assault on individual privacy that, if conducted by the government,
would have had the media howling. In their haste to accuse Dr. Berger of
medical malpractice, Inside Edition recklessly disregarded their own
obligations under the federal anti-wiretap law. Apparently the media claims
for itself privileges enjoyed nowhere else in society. 86 The events of this
case give rise to a specter of tyranny historically associated only with
government. Yet the court of appeals contented itself to note that their
decision was "not intended to constitute an approval" of Inside Edition's
actions."n This convenient fiction ignores an important economic reality
of the media in our society.
It is unlikely that the leviathan broadcasting companies are particularly
concerned about a few after-the-fact civil suits resulting from the broadcast
of surreptitious videotapes. As discussed earlier, the damage resulting from
184. In re King World Prods., Inc., 898 F.2d 56, 58 (6th Cir. 1990); Diet Doctor Loses Bid,
supra note 68.
185. At the time of the court of appeals decision, Dr. Berger was under investigation by the
New York State Department of Health, Office of Professional Medical Conduct. King Worl4 898
F.2d at 57.
186. See generally Miller, supra note 139, at 850.
187. King World, 898 F.2d at 60.
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such an invasion of privacy is extremely difficult to quantify and
prove.'88 While the cost of litigating a civil suit may be prohibitive for
an individual, for a multi-million dollar corporation it is literally just a cost
of doing business. Moreover, the boost to advertising revenues that high
ratings can bring may provide an incentive to risk litigation in pursuit of
those high ratings. With no possibility of having the broadcast of a film
segment enjoined, all any economic media network needs to concern itself
with is whether the potential boost to ratings, and thus revenues, is high
enough to compensate for any civil damages they may potentially incur.
Whether an individual's privacy is preserved from illegal action by the
media, then, will depend not on how those rights are weighed against the
rights of a free press in the context of our societal values, but on whether
the advertising revenues thus generated exceed any anticipated civil
damages. Surely the noble rights secured in the Constitution deserve a
more deliberative determination.
B. Commentaries on the State of Prior Restraint Law
Over the years, the subject of prior restraints has received a variety of
treatments by legal writers attempting to wring a cohesive system of
principles from the historical origins and case law. 89 There is certainly
general agreement on the nebulous state of the doctrine but less accord on
what shape a clear scheme of prior restraint should take.' While some
advocate retaining the traditional aversion, others question the appropriate-
ness of the simplistic, broad-sweeping presumption against prior re-
straints. 9 ' Two writers in particular have proposed solutions which seem
to offer a more equitable resolution to conflicts like the one in King World.
Professor Martin H. Redish attributes the ambiguous state of the
doctrine to a lack of judicial analysis: "[F]irst Amendment interests are not
served by attempts to avoid difficult questions by use of oversimplified
formulas. Nowhere is this more evident than in the current structure of the
prior restraint doctrine."'" Rejecting traditional arguments supporting the
presumption against prior restraints, he instead advocates a requirement of
a full and fair judicial hearing before any prior restraint may be made.'
188. See supra part WV.C.
189. See infra this part.
190. See infra this part.
191. Redish, supra note 5; Jeffries, supra note 14.
192. Redish, supra note 5, at 54, 100 (footnote omitted).
193. IL at 58.
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Professor John C. Jeffries advocates abandoning the rule altogether,
characterizing it as "a doctrine of honored past but contemporary
irrelevance--a formulation whose current contribution to the interpretation
of the First Amendment is chiefly confusion.""' Jeffries believes the
focus should be on balancing rights brought into conflict by the challenged
communication and not on the form of relief requested, whether a prior
restraint or a subsequent punishment. 95 "The difficult process of judicial
weighing is," he believes, "entirely unaided by reference to the doctrine of
prior restraint." 9 6
Both views share a theme only superficially treated by the court of
appeals in King World-the balancing of interests. The rule against prior
restraint enjoys such a strong tradition, that it has impeded the progress of
judicial analysis of First Amendment rights. The world is a different place
than it was when the rule was developed. The media represent a powerful
element in our society. It has been suggested that it is not the media that
needs protection but individuals who need protection from the media."
As Professor Jeffries observed, the process of judicial weighing is a
difficult one."9 ' Imposing an artificial restriction on remedies purely in
compliance with a tradition whose justification has faded does indeed
obscure the issues involved in balancing conflicting rights.'"
C. The First Fruit of King World
All of this raises the question of where this case will take the law of
prior restraint. It would be tempting to dismiss King World as an isolated
case destined for obscurity. It could be hoped that the media will exercise
a good measure of self-restraint in the exercise of its unique privilege.
At least part of the answer came less than three months after the court
of appeals in King World rendered its decision. In April 1990, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, at the request of a young
girl, issued an order restraining Lifetime Cable, a television network, from
airing a film in which the girl describes instances of alleged sexual
abuse.' The girl's guardian claimed the. film was made surreptitiously;
194. Jeffries, supra note 14, at 420, 437.
195. Id. at 437.
196. Id.
197. Miller, supra note 139, at 843-44.
198. Jeffries, supra note 14, at 437.
199. See supra this part.
200. Foretich v. Lifetime Cable, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1647 (1990).
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Lifetime Cable denied that charge. °1 Finding the girl would suffer
"irreparable harm" from the broadcast, the district court judge issued the
order pending a preliminary injunction hearing.' The Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit, citing King World in a short, unpublished decision,
vacated the district court's order.' The court stated, "[any rights that
[the father] or [the girl] may have must... be redressed in legal actions
that do not require a prior restraint in derogation of the First Amend-
ment."2 4
VI. CONCLUSION
The presumption against prior restraints has played an important role
in preserving the vitality of the First Amendment freedom of the press
clause. As technology progresses, however, the threats to privacy are
becoming greater than could possibly have been imagined by the drafters
of the Constitution. The law must continue to provide meaningful remedies
to those whose privacy is unjustly invaded by media companies whose
motives necessarily include not only news reporting but profit as well. The
presumption against prior restraints should be relaxed in the case of news
regarding private individuals to permit a rational weighing of the media's
right to report and the individual's right to be left alone.
William Medlen*
201. Victor A. Kovner & Harriette K. Dorsen, Recent Developments in Intrusion, Private
Facts, False Light and Commercialization Claims, Nov. 8-9, 1990, available in Westlaw, TP-ALL
database.
202. Foretich v. Lifetime Cable, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1647 (1990).
203. Id. at 1648.
204. Id
* Dedicated to my family, to Larry and to Helen and Guy.
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